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Income Mobility of Owners of Small Businesses 





Ownership of small businesses can facilitate upward mobility through the income hierarchy 
and help individuals maintain a place at the higher end of the income distribution hierarchy. 
This paper compares the positional stability of owners of small businesses with that of wage 
earners, arguing that describing the relative position of different occupations faces definitional 
challenges. For instance, the Norwegian dual income tax system encourages owners of small 
businesses to establish widely held firms, with themselves as employees, because it reduces 
the tax burden and increases post-tax income. Descriptions of income distribution mobility of 
different occupations are therefore in danger of being misleading if such occupational 
measurement problems are not taken into account. I discuss in this paper the income mobility 
of owners of small firms in Norway 1993–2003 by estimating income transition models for 
different definitions of occupational status. Business ownership facilitates upward mobility 
and helps owners maintain a place at the top of the income distribution scale, and wider 
definitions of what counts as a small business owner enhance these correlations. However, as 
the paper shows, business owners are more mobile than wage earners and therefore 
overrepresented at the lower and higher ends of the income distribution ranking, irrespective 
of definition. 
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1. Introduction 
Policy-makers are paying increasing attention to the economic conditions under which owners of 
small firms operate, not least because small businesses are considered to be vital to economic growth, 
innovation and the dynamics of economic systems. This concern for the small business is reflected in 
tax policies. For instance, the low, flat-rate capital income tax that is common to the dual income tax 
systems of Norway and the other Nordic countries was designed to encourage entrepreneurial 
initiative and other business activities. In this paper we ask whether owners of small businesses have 
experienced any improvement in their position on the income scale (relative to wage earners) in the 
period from 1993 to 2003. This particular timeframe was chosen because the dual income tax system 
came into force in Norway in 1992.
1 Insofar as dual income tax systems are clearly of some 
considerable interest to policy-makers worldwide, it is desirable to obtain information about effects of 
such tax systems on, for instance, the performance of owners of small businesses.  
  A main point of this paper is that identifying business owners in the data is a significant 
challenge, a problem exacerbated by the dual income tax system. The present study uses income 
statistics for persons and families compiled by Statistics Norway (2006a). They include information 
obtained from income tax returns for the whole population for every year between 1993 and 2003. As 
the whole population is covered, it is a rich source of information. However, owners of incorporated 
businesses are categorized as employees in these data, whereas in most other respects they are 
classified as business owners, similar to the self-employed. This is a definitional measurement 
problem in many countries, including the US and the UK (Parker, 2004).  
  The Norwegian dual income tax system exacerbated the problem. It levyed a flat 28 percent 
tax rate on corporate income, capital and labor income, and then imposed a progressive surtax 
schedule on labor income, taxing wage income at 49.5 percent at the margin.
2 While this system did 
away with the double taxation of dividends and gave tax-payers full credit for dividend payments at 
the corporate level, the capital gains taxation system introduced a valuation system to control for gains 
already paid for through retained firm profit. However, as these disparate schedules for capital and 
labor income threatened to increase the likelihood of income shifting, preventive regulations were 
enforced with the introduction under the tax reform of 1992 of what was known as the split model of 
taxation for the self-employed and closely held firms (i.e., firms in which more than two-thirds of the 
shares are held by one person). Under this model, business income was divided into a capital and a 
labor income tax base, the latter being subject to surtax. Owners of closely held firms are normally 
                                                      
1 A reformed tax system was put in place in 2006, see Sørensen (2005). 
2 This is according to the schedule of 1993, in which the second tier of the surtax was applicable for incomes above NOK 
230,000 (US$ 32,500 according to exchange rates for 2003, 1USD=7.08 NOK, which we use in this paper).   3
categorized as wage earners. With the split model, owners of small businesses could incorporate as a 
widely held firm, with an ownership share of less than two-thirds. These active owners are classified 
as employees, but could still take advantage of the gap between capital and wage income taxation by 
being paid in terms of dividends instead of salary. Thoresen and Alstadsæter (2008) find that some of 
the features of the dual income tax work in combination with some of the features of human capital 
intensive businesses to facilitate organizational shifts, providing substantial income gains for the 
people involved. The evidence presented here substantiates some of the implications of these shifts 
with regard to the overall economic advancement of business owners.  
  Small business ownership can take one of three organizational forms: the owner can be 
denominated as self-employed (or sole proprietor); ownership can take the form of the closely held 
firm under the split model; or, finally, as the widely held firm. Business owners who incorporate as 
one of the two latter options are classified as wage earners, even though their activities are very similar 
to those of the self-employed. Under these circumstances, allowing the self-employed to represent 
owners of small businesses when discussing the effects of business ownership on income growth, we 
are in danger of seriously misleading our audience. 
  In exploring such definitional challenges, the paper shows that owners of small businesses 
do in fact operate under various organizational forms, and that different tax systems can affect the 
significance of this definitional problem. To identify owners of small businesses characterized as 
widely held firms, we compare data retrieved from the newly established Register of Shareholders 
with data from the End of the Year Certificate Register.
3 This allows us to discuss the relationship 
between income gain and business ownership for different definitions of business owner, applying a 
wide definition that incorporates owners whose businesses are classified as widely held firms.  
  Previous contributions on mobility of business owners, see e.g., Holtz-Eakin et al. (2000), 
Fairlie (2004; 2005), note that running a business creates an opportunity for upward mobility for 
disadvantaged groups. Given the emphasis of the present study on business owners involved in tax 
avoiding organizational shifts and ownership of small businesses as a means of getting rich and 
staying rich, our focus is on the effect on the upper part of the income distribution. Of course, we 
could have used cross-sectional data to examine relationships, identifying the number of business 
owners in the upper part of the income distribution in repeated cross-sections over the period. 
However, by adopting a longitudinal perspective we get a better understanding the relationship 
between business ownership and income over time. The main approach of the present paper is to 
discuss income mobility by estimating transition rates, using various definitions of income hierarchy 
movement as the dependent variable and focusing on business ownership as an explanatory variable, 
                                                      
3 See Statistics Norway (2006b) and Statistics Norway (2006c) for documentation of the two registers, respectively.   4
also controlling for observed characteristics and unobserved individual effects. We want to know 
whether business ownership induces upward mobility in the income hierarchy and whether business 
ownership helps owners maintain a position at the high end of the income distribution.   
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews earlier studies on the relationship 
between occupation and income mobility. Section 3 presents the register data used in this study. We 
also ask here whether the individual level data we have available for this study replicate household 
level trends in income inequality before discussing initial evidence from mobility tables. In Section 4 
we probe deeper into correlations between business ownership and placement in the income 
distribution by estimating a random effects transition model. Section 5 closes the paper.     
2.  Discussions in the literature on the relationship between 
involvement in small businesses and income mobility 
When analyzing the relationship between income and business activities, it is important to note that 
there is no obvious direction of causality; occupational choice and income will often be seen as 
simultaneous variables. In the occupational choice literature, incomes or yields in different states, e.g., 
in wage employment or self-employment, are used as explanatory variables.  
  The main ambition of the present study is to assess the effect of involvement in business 
activities on income development. In that respect the present study aligns itself with the literature on 
entrepreneurship and self-employment as a means of upward mobility in the income hierarchy. This 
means that the occupational choice variable crosses over to the explanatory variables. A number of 
papers by Fairlie discuss business ownership and entrepreneurship as a route out of poverty and 
unemployment for disadvantaged families. Two of them (Fairlie 2004; 2005), are based on estimations 
of earnings regressions, and employ panel data and fixed effect identification strategies. Both show 
some evidence of the claim that business ownership provides a route for economic advancement, 
balanced against opportunities in the wage/salary sector.
4 Similarly, Holtz-Eakin et al. (2000) note that 
social climbing by dint of one’s own business acumen, as personified by the successful protagonists of 
Horatio Alger’s rags-to-riches novels, has a powerful hold on American society. They estimate a 
version of a Markov model by ordinary least squares, where the dependent variable is the percentile in 
year t+1, explained by the percentile in year t and a number of other explanatory variables. In order to 
allow for non-linearities in the relationship between present and past positions, a quadratic 
specification is employed. They find that self-employment is beneficial for individuals starting out at 
                                                      
4 However, there are differences between male and female groups, as the latter do not benefit from self-employment as 
business owners, according to Fairlie (2005).    5
the low end of the earnings distribution, whereas those who started up near the top of the distribution 
experienced a loss, compared to the wage earners. 
  It should be noted that the present study focuses more on the upper part of the income 
distribution, unlike many other studies of business ownership. The main issue here is business 
ownership as a means of ascending to and staying in the upper reaches of the income distribution, 
given that the business owners face “privileges” in terms a tax system which facilitates, if not 
encourages, tax avoidance. 
  There are other closely related analyses of distributional effects of business ownership: for 
instance, Hamiliton (2000) discusses explanations to differences in earnings distributions for self-
employed workers and paid employees, whereas Jenkins (1995) and Parker (1999) employ population 
sub-group inequality decomposition methods when discussing the relationship between income 
inequality and self-employment. 
3. Some empirical preliminaries 
3.1 Data 
Identifying owners of small businesses is a challenging task, as noted by, e.g., Plesko (1995), Holtz-
Eakin (2000) and Parker (2004). The data on small businesses come in corporate and individual level 
versions. This is illustrated in Figure 1, where we show developments at the personal level, the upper 
panel for the period 1993–2003, and at the corporate level, the lower panel for the period 1995–2003. 
In the upper panel we divide the individuals in work into wage earners and self-employed, based on 
information in the Norwegian national accounts (Skoglund, 2001), derived originally from the labour 
force survey. Among what are defined as the self-employed, some people organize their activities as 
sole proprietorships and partnerships. The lower panel shows the corporate level data, based on 
income statistics for limited companies (Statistics Norway, 2008). Corporations are either closely held 
or widely held firms. A closely held firm is defined by active owners (working more than 300 hours 
annually) holding more than two thirds of the shares. However, active owners in closely held and 
widely held firms will normally be defined as wage earners if they work in the business they own and 
hence be included in the wage earner category in the upper panel. However, as this paper argues, the 
category “owners of small businesses” should include self-employed and active owners of closely held 
firms. Moreover, and this is a main point here, many active owners of widely held firms should be 
placed in the small business category. The idea finds empirical support in the number of business 
owners who re-classified their business for tax reasons during the nineties, taking the opportunity 
encouraged by the Norwegian dual income tax system to reclassify the business as a widely held firm   6
(Thoresen and Alstadsæter, 2008). Descriptions in Figure 1 accord with this; we see a decrease in the 
number of self-employed, a stable number of closely held firms and a substantial increase in the 
number of widely held firms. 
 
Figure 1.  Number of wage earners and self-employed 1993–2003, number of widely held and 
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Sources: Labour force survey, Income statistics for limited companies 
 
  The data on which this study is mainly based are from the Income Statistics on Persons and 
Families, see Statistics Norway (2006a). These statistics hold register-based information on the whole 
population, based primarily on income tax returns filed with the Directorate of Taxes' Register of 
Personal Tax-Payers. Other sources provide many of the demographic variables. Thus, as these data   7
cover the whole population, they are rich in information. 1993 was chosen as the first year of the 
analysis because that was when the register itself was established.  
  In terms of scope we restrict the analysis to individuals with a connection to the workforce; 
pensioners and students are therefore excluded. We did this by excluding all except prime aged 
individuals, i.e., persons aged 25–55 in the period 1993–2003, earning a wage or business income in 
excess of the Basic Pension Unit of the National Insurance Scheme in every year of the period. In 
1993 the Basic Pension Unit was NOK 37,033 (USD 5,230), rising to NOK 55,964 (USD 7,900) in 
2003. After these constraints, we were left with a sample of approximately 900,000 individuals, wage 
earners and self-employed. As data come from public records, the present analysis does not suffer 
from attrition problems, as frequently reported in other panel data analyses. 
  Farmers and fishermen are usually defined as self-employed.
5 However, as Norwegian 
primary industries are heavily subsidized and regulated, we excluded these groups from the sample. 
Nor are they included in the categories “owners of small businesses” or “wage earners”. 
  As already noted, there are three categories of small business owner: self-employed; owners 
of closely held corporations under the split-model; and owners of widely held corporations. The self-
employed are identified by reporting business income from self-employment (positive or negative). 
Owners of closely held corporations are recognized in that they report imputed labor income under the 
split model in combination with reporting wage income.
6 The main problem, when addressing this 
issue empirically, is that it has previously been impossible to identify owners of small firms who run 
their business as a widely held firm. Income tax return data let us observe individuals who combine 
wage earning status with status as a recipient of dividends, but so far we have been unable to ascertain 
whether the wages and dividends come from the same firm. Obviously, this is essential for identifying 
owners of small businesses. However, the new Register of Shareholders has changed all this. By 
combining information from the Register of Shareholders and wage information from the End of the 
Year Certificate Register, which tells us which firm is paying the individual’s wages, it is now 
possible to find wage earners who are simultaneously employees and major shareholders of the same 
firm. However, 2004 was the first year for which the Register of Shareholders issued data, so we rely 
on data from 2004 to establish end-of-period status only. As we have a longitudinal perspective in this 
analysis, we need to make assumptions about status in previous years. We do this as follows. We let 
information on status in 2004 determine status in 2003. If subjects, according to the data, were likely 
wage earners before 2003, we assume it holds true for the preceding years. If they are identified as 
self-employed or owners of a closely held corporation in preceding years, the business will likely have 
                                                      
5 See Parker (2004) for more details on different definitions of firms.    8
changed organizational classification in the period. By placing further constraints on the size of the 
firm and degree of ownership or control, we can begin to identify small business owners who run their 
businesses as widely held firms.
7 
  Thus, in discussing the relationship between income mobility and small business ownership, 
the study deploys two definitions of the latter. The first is a narrow definition which includes the self-
employed and owners of closely held firms. The second is a wider definition which in addition to the 
categories just mentioned covers some owners of widely held firms. Table 1 presents the number of 
observations used in the present study, categorized into wage earners and the two definitions of small 
business owner. The wide definition gives us the figures for wage earners, as it places a number of 
“wage earners” in widely held firms in the business owner category. It shows that the wide definition 
increases the number of business owners substantially. As the years progress, the number of wage 
earners decreases and the number of owners of small businesses grows. However, behind this overall 
picture, individuals are switching occupations; an issue to which we return in Section 3.     
 
Table 1.   Number of observations, 1993–2003 
  Wage earners (derived 
by the wide def. of 
small businesses) 
Owners of small 
businesses, narrow 
definition 
Owners of small 
businesses, wide 
definition 
1993 769,088  102,178  128,428 
1994 767,575  103,601  129,941 
1995 765,279  106,604  132,237 
1996 765,935  105,246  131,581 
1997 765,951  105,456  131,565 
1998 764,122  106,603  133,394 
1999 764,437  105,892  133,079 
2000 763,222  107,104  134,294 
2001 762,137  108,736  135,379 
2002 762,869  107,911  134,647 
2003 764,341  106,196  133,175 
 
3.2   Income inequality among business owners and wage earners: individual 
versus household data  
In most countries, income inequality is higher among the self-employed than among wage earners 
(Parker, 2004), and even though we focus on a broader group of business owners, we expect this to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
6 Some owners of closely held firms will not be identified as their income is too small to generate positive imputed labor 
income under the split model. 
7 This method also implies that some owners of closely held firms will be correctly categorized as business owners, i.e. those 
who do not report imputed labor income under the split model. They are few compared to the business owners involved in 
organizational shifts.    9
hold true in the present case as well. Moreover, as income mobility can be studied at the individual 
and household level, we ask how far the results obtained from the use of the individual data replicate 
results based on household data.   
  There is little theoretical guidance with regard to explaining the forces underlying the wider 
income inequality found among the self-employed (Parker, 2004). It is generally accepted that 
incomes from business ownership are more uncertain than wages, but causal links between these 
factors and income inequality are hard to establish.  
  Figure 2 contains two panels; the upper panel shows changes in income inequality for 
business owners and wage earners based on individual income, and the lower panel for wage earners 
and self-employed based on household category. The household data are taken into account by 
aggregating income over all household members, dividing the sum by an equivalence scale to allow 
for economies of scale,
8 and letting each household be represented with as many persons as there are 
household members. The allocation of households between income earners and self-employed is based 
on the status of the main income earner. The results presented on Figure 2 are reassuring with regard 
to both  of the questions posed by the study. First, they confirm higher inequality among business 
owners than among wage earners, both at the individual and household level. Second, we see that the 
individual data basically describe the period 1993–2003 in the same manner as when the household is 
used as the unit of analysis. We also see (upper panel) that using the narrow or the wider definition of 
owners of businesses does have effect on year-specific inequality measures. The wider definition gives 
more income inequality by the end of the period, which we expected, given Thoresen and 
Alstadsæter’s (2008) finding that business owners shift organizational form to reduce the tax burden 
and increase post-tax income. 
 
                                                      
8 The equivalence scale is defined as the square root of the number of household members, children included.   10
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3.3   The link between business ownership and mobility. Evidence from the 
transition matrices 
A transition matrix forms the natural starting point for studies of income mobility. In this section 
mobility evidence from transition matrices will be discussed, whereas the next section will look at the 
relationship between occupations (on varying definitions) and income mobility in terms of a dynamic 
process.     11
  However, let us first see how the owners of small businesses distribute on different quintiles 
in the period under consideration. Table 2 describes the location of wage earners and the owners of 
small businesses on the distribution scale of post-tax incomes on the two definitions of small business 
owner. Table 2 shows the distribution of wage earners and business owners in the overall distributions 
of post-tax income, but where percentage shares for each occupation group sum to 100. The results of 
Table 2 reflect the wider dispersion of incomes among business owners. Whereas wage earners are 
more or less equally distributed on quintiles, owners of small businesses are much more likely to be 
found in quintiles 1 and 5. For instance, 25 percent of all owners of small businesses were in quintile 1 
in 1993, according to the wide definition. It is also important to note how the wide definition increases 
the share of owners ending up in quintile 5, especially at the end of the period, which is in accordance 
with expectations. However, the difference is small. 
 
Table 2.   Distributions of wage earners and owners of small businesses, according to two 
definitions. Distributions on quintiles for each group, 1993-2003 
  Wage earners  Owners of small businesses, 
narrow definition 
Owners of small businesses, wide 
definition 
Year Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
-93  19.1 21.0 21.2 20.7 18.0 28.6 13.8 12.1 14.5 31.0 25.1 13.8 13.1 15.8 32.1 
-94  19.1 21.1 21.2 20.7 17.9 29.2 13.2 11.9 14.5 31.2 25.6 13.3 12.8 15.8 32.6 
-95  18.9 21.2 21.3 20.7 17.8 30.2 12.9 11.6 14.5 30.8 26.5 12.9 12.3 15.7 32.6 
-96  18.9 21.2 21.3 20.7 17.9 30.3 13.2 12.0 14.5 30.0 26.3 13.0 12.6 15.8 32.4 
-97  18.9 21.2 21.3 20.7 17.9 30.3 13.5 12.0 14.8 29.5 26.2 13.1 12.5 15.9 32.3 
-98  19.1 21.3 21.3 20.6 17.8 28.9 13.2 12.4 15.6 30.0 25.1 12.7 12.8 16.7 32.8 
-99  19.0 21.3 21.3 20.6 17.9 29.9 12.9 12.3 15.6 29.3 25.9 12.5 12.7 16.6 32.3 
-00  19.3 21.4 21.3 20.5 17.6 27.9 12.5 12.6 16.3 30.7 24.2 12.1 12.8 17.1 33.8 
-01  19.1 21.4 21.3 20.5 17.7 28.1 12.5 12.4 16.1 30.8 24.9 12.3 12.8 17.2 32.8 
-02  19.3 21.4 21.2 20.5 17.5 27.0 12.6 12.7 16.3 31.5 23.8 12.3 12.9 16.9 34.0 
-03  18.6 21.4 21.4 20.8 17.8 32.1 12.2 11.9 14.3 29.5 27.9 11.9 12.1 15.1 32.9 
 
  Another way of addressing the distribution of small business owners across quintiles is to 
calculate the proportion of owners in different quintiles. This is done in Table 3, where we compare 
the narrow and the wider definitions. In contrast to Table 2, the figures in Table 2 reflect the size of 
the business owner sector relative to the wage earner sector across quintiles. For instance, in 1993, in 
the lowest quintile of the income hierarchy, 16.3 percent were owners of small businesses, whereas the 
corresponding estimate for the 20 percent richest was 17.6 percent.    12
Table 3.   Percentage share of owners of small businesses in quintiles (according to two 
definitions), 1993-2003 
  Owners of small businesses, narrow 
definition  Owners of small businesses, wide definition 
Year Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
-93  16.3 7.9  6.9  8.3 17.6  18.0 9.9  9.4 11.3  23.0 
-94  16.9 7.6  6.9  8.4 18.0  18.5 9.6  9.2 11.4  23.6 
-95  18.0 7.7  6.9  8.6 18.3  19.5 9.5  9.1 11.5  24.0 
-96  17.8 7.7  7.0  8.5 17.6  19.3 9.5  9.2 11.5  23.8 
-97  17.8 7.9  7.0  8.7 17.4  19.2 9.6  9.1 11.7  23.7 
-98  17.1 7.8  7.4  9.2 17.8  18.6 9.5  9.5 12.4  24.3 
-99  17.7 7.6  7.3  9.2 17.3  19.2 9.3  9.4 12.3  24.0 
-00  16.6 7.5  7.5  9.7 18.3  18.1 9.1  9.6 12.8  25.3 
-01  17.0 7.6  7.5  9.8 18.7  18.7 9.3  9.7 13.0  24.8 
-02  16.2 7.5  7.6  9.8 18.9  17.9 9.2  9.7 12.7  25.5 
-03  19.0 7.2  7.0  8.5 17.4  20.7 9.0  9.0 11.2  24.4 
 
  Turning to mobility tables, we can identify how the same individuals move from one point in 
time to the next, the main hypotheses being that business ownership covaries with upward movements 
along the income distribution hierarchy and secures positions at the high end of the scale. In this 
perspective, the income gains from business ownership may follow from different combinations of 
connections to business ownership over time: e.g., individuals are business owners for the whole 
period, or they shift from wage earner to business owner, or, not at least given the issue raised in this 
paper, they may be involved in organizational shifts as a business owner.  
  The timeframe of the analysis is important. For instance, it is well known that mobility 
patterns depend on the length of the transition period (Atkinson et al., 1992; Holtz-Eakin et al., 2000). 
The period is important both with respect to the measurement of income, occupational categorization 
and measurement of shift. Here the main focus is on year-on-year transitions, but we also give the 
results for income measures based on aggregations for several calendar years. Moreover, as mobility 
patterns may change during the period to which the data refer (1993–2003), separate estimates for 
transitions early and late in the period will be presented. However, the main focus here is on mobility 
according to the two definitions of business owner, the narrow and the wide definition.  
    13
Table 4.   Percentage of owners of small firms for combinations of period t-1 and period t 
quintiles. Yearly transitions, 1993–1994, 1997–1998, and 2002–2003 for two 
definitions of business owners. 
Transitions 1993–1994, owners of small businesses in both periods 
Narrow def.: self-employed, owners of closely 
held firms (87,666 obs) 
Wide def.: self-employed, owners of closely held 
and widely held firms (116,417 obs) 
To quintile    To quintile    From 
quintile  1 2 3 4 5  Total 
From 
quintile 1 2 3 4 5  Total 
1  21.6 3.6 1.6 1.0 1.0 28.8  1  18.0  3.3 1.4 1.0 0.9 24.6 
2  4.7 4.5 2.5 1.4 0.9 14.0  2  4.1 5.0 2.6 1.4 0.8 13.9 
3  1.7 2.6 3.5 2.6 1.5 11.9  3  1.5 2.8 4.5 2.9 1.4 13.0 
4  1.0 1.5 2.8 5.1 3.9 14.3  4  0.9 1.4 3.0 6.5 4.1 15.8 
5  0.8 0.8 1.3 4.0 24.2  31.1  5  0.7 0.7 1.2 4.0 26.1  32.7 
Total  29.8 13.0 11.6 14.2 31.4 100.0 Total  25.3 13.1 12.7 15.7 33.2 100.0
Transitions 1997–1998, owners of small businesses in both periods 
Narrow def.: self-employed, owners of closely 
held firms (89,754 obs) 
Wide def.: self-employed, owners of closely held 
and widely held firms (118,996 obs) 
To quintile    To quintile    From 
quintile  1 2 3 4 5  Total 
From 
quintile 1 2 3 4 5  Total 
1  22.9 4.3 2.0 1.3 0.9 31.4  1  18.8  3.7 1.7 1.1 0.8 24.6 
2  3.7 4.4 2.7 1.8 0.9 13.5  2  3.3 4.6 2.7 1.6 0.8 13.9 
3  1.5 2.5 3.6 2.9 1.3 11.7  3  1.3 2.4 4.2 3.1 1.3 13.0 
4  0.9 1.3 2.6 5.7 4.0 14.4  4  0.8 1.2 2.8 6.8 4.3 15.8 
5  0.9 0.7 1.1 3.5  22.8  29.0  5  0.9 0.7 1.2 3.9  26.2  32.7 
Total  29.9 13.1 12.0 15.1 29.9 100.0 Total  25.1 12.6 12.5 16.4 33.4 100.0
Transitions 2002–2003, owners of small businesses in both periods 
Narrow def.: self-employed, owners of closely 
held firms (90,957 obs) 
Wide def.: self-employed, owners of closely held 
and widely held firms (121,041 obs) 
To quintile    To quintile    From 
quintile  1 2 3 4 5  Total 
From 
quintile 1 2 3 4 5  Total 
1  22.0 2.9 1.3 0.7 1.0 27.8  1  18.1  2.6 1.2 0.7 1.1 23.7 
2  5.2 3.6 2.0 1.0 0.6 12.4  2  4.4 3.8 2.1 1.0 0.7 12.1 
3  3.1 2.5 3.5 2.2 1.0 12.4  3  2.6 2.4 3.9 2.4 1.3 12.6 
4  2.1 2.0 3.0 5.7 3.1 15.9  4  1.8 1.8 3.0 6.3 3.8 16.7 
5  1.5 1.1 1.6 4.1  23.2  31.5  5  1.4 1.0 1.6 4.3  26.5  34.9 
Total  33.8 12.1 11.5 13.7 28.9 100.0 Total  28.3 11.7 11.8 14.8 33.4 100.0
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  Let us first address information on yearly transitions for owners of small business in period t-
1 and period t. Table 4 presents mobility tables, based on quintiles, for three periods, 1993–1994, 
1997–1998, and 2002–2003, and for the two definitions. Results are presented in terms of 
(unconditional) percentages in each cell, showing the percentage of owners of small businesses 
combining being in quintile r in period t-1 and quintile s in period t. For instance, Table 4 shows that 
of all the owners of small businesses, according to the narrow definition, 21.6 of them were in quintile 
1 both at time t-1 and at time t.  
  Upward mobility will be reflected by a larger percentage in higher quintiles in period t, 
compared to period t-1, see Table 4. We also expect the wider definition to show higher upward 
mobility than the narrow definition, probably towards the end of the period, i.e., 1997–1998 and 2002–
2003 compared to 1993–94.  
  Table 4 does not indicate substantial upward mobility of owners of small businesses. The 
share of owners of small firms in quintile 5 in year t-1 is little different from the share in year t; 
compare column totals and row totals for quintile 5. As expected, the wider definition results in better 
performance for owners of small businesses, but we do not observe increased upwards movement in 
the period. In fact, there were fewer owners in quintile 5 in 2003 than in 2002. If we extend the 
income measurement period, i.e., transitions when rankings (in both t-1 and t) are determined by 
aggregate post-tax income for several years (aggregate incomes for period 1993–1998 and period 
1998–2003), the pattern (not shown) is basically the same as seen in Table 4. Similar results are also 
seen for a longer transition period, e.g., comparing transitions between 1993 (t-1) and 2003 (t). 
  Such tables can straightforwardly be turned into indices of overall mobility. Let us therefore 
first consider what estimates of indices of mobility say about overall mobility of business owners and 
wage earners. Table 5 presents estimates of overall mobility over the three periods for the three 
subgroups, for two measures of income mobility. The two mobility measures are defined in terms of 
conditional transition probabilities, 
 
pjk , the probability that an individual moves to class k given that 
he/she was initially in class j. The mapping of the probabilities into indices of mobility follows 
suggestions by Prais (1955)/Shorrocks (1978) (PS) and Bartholomew (1982) (B), seen as 
(1) 
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respectively, where m is the number of income classes and π j is the initial income distribution. PS 
measures the average probability across all income classes that a person leaves the initial class in the 
succeeding period, whereas B measures the average number of income classes crossed by all 
individuals; see e.g., Formby et al. (2004) for more details.  
  The results of Table 5 confirm the substantially higher income mobility of small business 
owners than wage earners. Both measures of income mobility show this across all three time periods.
9   
 
Table 4.   Income mobility of wage earners and owners of small businesses, 1993–1994, 1997–
1998, and 2002–2003   





Owners of small 
businesses, narrow 
definition 
Owners of small 
businesses, wide 
definition 
PS  0.423 0.538 0.516  1993-94 
B  0.415 0.556 0.536 
PS  0.408 0.534 0.516  1997-98 
B  0.390 0.554 0.537 
PS  0.369 0.558 0.553  2002-03 
B  0.357 0.594 0.587 
 
  Improvements in the relative positions of owners of small firms may also be reflected by this 
occupational group’s overrepresentation at the high end of the income distribution: firm owners are 
immobile at the top of the income distribution. To test this hypothesis, we compared results from 
Table 4 to similar mobility tables for wage earners. The result for wage earners is presented in Table 6. 
The relevant comparison is the probability of staying in quintile 5 (quintile 5 both at t-1 and at t) over 
the probability of being in quintile 5 in period t-1 for owners of small businesses (Table 4) and wage 
earners (Table 6). Both tables generate probabilities for staying in quintile 5 around 0.8. In other 
words, staying rich does not appear to be affected by business ownership, according to the mobility 
tables.  
 
                                                      
9 There are probably effects from ageing in the panel, which may account for some of the reduction in mobility for wage 
earners.   16
Table 6.   Percentage of wage earners for combinations of period t-1 and period t quintiles. 
Yearly transitions, 1993–1994 and 2002–2003. 
Wage earner mobility, 1993–1994 (755,564 obs)  Wage earner mobility, 2002–2003 (750,735 obs) 
To quintile    To quintile    From 
quintile  1 2 3 4 5  Total 
From 
quintile 1 2 3 4 5  Total 
1  14.1  3.2 1.0 0.5 0.2 19.0  1  14.9  3.5 0.5 0.2 0.2 19.2 
2  3.8  12.7 3.5 0.8 0.2 21.1  2  2.6  14.1 4.1 0.6 0.1 21.5 
3  0.6 4.4 12.2 3.6 0.4 21.3  3  0.5 3.2  13.3  4.0 0.3 21.3 
4 0.3  0.7  4.2  13.1  2.6  20.8  4 0.3  0.6  3.3  13.9  2.5  20.6 
5 0.1  0.1  0.3  2.9  14.3  17.9  5 0.2  0.2  0.3  2.2  14.5  17.4 
Total  18.9 21.2 21.3 20.8 17.8 100.0 Total  18.4 21.5 21.5 20.9 17.7 100.0
 
  The mobility matrices presented in Table 4 and Table 6 are based on individuals whose 
occupational status remains unchanged throughout the period. It is interesting to see to whether 
occupational shifts do in fact covary with upward movements. In Table 7 mobility matrices for two 
types of change from period t to period t-1 are presented: shift from wage earner to small business 
owner and from self-employment or closely held firm to owner of widely held firm. The latter shift 
captures the effect of changing the organizational form of the business, whereas the former captures 
the more traditional effect of leaving employment to run a business. Ideally, one should also explore 
the shift from being a (real) wage earner to running a business through a widely held firm. However, 
our data are not perfect, and we base our identification of owners of widely held firms on information 
from the end of the period; categorizations in preceding years are based on imputations (see Section 
3.1). 
  The mobility matrices of Table 7 indicate a benefit from shifting occupation from wage 
earner to small business owner in terms of position in the income hierarchy; see the left hand side of 
the table. The proportion of “shifters” in quintile 5 at time t, for instance, is larger than the proportion 
in quintile 5 in period t-1 for all three transitions presented in Table 7.  
  With respect to the organizational shift of owners of small businesses (from self-employment 
and closely held firm to widely held firm), these individuals, crucially, are overrepresented in quintile 
5 both before and after the organizational shift (see the right hand side of Table 6), and income 
positions are less influenced by the transition; if anything, we can observe a small decrease in 
proportions in quintile 5 (especially for the 1998–1999 transitions).  
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Table 7.     Shifts from wage earner to owner of small business and shift from self-employment 
and closely held firm to widely held firm. Percentage of “shifters” for combinations of 
period t-1 and period t quintiles. Yearly transitions, 1993–1994, 1997–1998, and 2002–
2003. 
Transitions 1993–1994 
From wage earner to owner of small business 
(13,524 obs) 
From self-employment and closely held firm to 
widely held firm (2,501 obs) 
To quintile    To quintile    From 
quintile  1 2 3 4 5  Total 
From 
quintile 1 2 3 4 5  Total 
1  19.5  4.6 2.1 1.7 1.7 29.5  1  6.9 2.8 1.2 1.1 1.6 13.6 
2  4.9 5.5 3.2 2.0 1.4 17.1  2  1.8 3.8 1.8 1.7 0.6  9.7 
3  2.1 2.8 4.9 3.4 1.7 14.8  3  1.1 2.8 4.2 3.2 1.6 12.8 
4  0.9 1.3 2.6 6.5 4.4 15.7  4  0.8 1.0 2.7 7.3 5.2 17.0 
5  0.7 0.5 0.9 2.8  18.0  22.9  5  1.3 1.2 2.2 4.8  37.4  46.9 
Total  28.1 14.7 13.7 16.4 27.2 100.0 Total  11.8 11.6 12.2 18.0 46.5 100.0
Transitions 1998–1999 
From wage earner to owner of small business 
(14,398 obs) 
From self-employment and closely held firm to 
widely held firm (3,133 obs) 
To quintile    To quintile    From 
quintile  1 2 3 4 5  Total 
From 
quintile 1 2 3 4 5  Total 
1  17.4  4.2 2.3 1.3 1.1 26.2  1  4.6 1.7 1.1 1.2 1.1  9.6 
2  4.1 5.6 3.3 2.0 1.1 16.1  2  1.6 2.8 1.9 1.3 0.9  8.5 
3  1.8 2.4 5.6 4.0 1.5 15.3  3  1.2 1.9 2.8 2.6 1.6 10.1 
4  1.0 1.1 3.1 8.4 4.5 18.1  4  0.8 1.3 2.4 7.0 5.3 16.8 
5  0.9 0.4 0.8 2.8  19.4  24.3  5  2.7 1.5 2.8 7.1  40.9  55.0 
Total  25.2 13.7 15.2 18.5 27.5 100.0 Total  10.9  9.2  11.1 19.2 49.7 100.0
Transitions 2002–2003 
From wage earner to owner of small business 
(12,134 obs) 
From self-employment and closely held firm to 
widely held firm (3,348 obs) 
To quintile    To quintile    From 
quintile  1 2 3 4 5  Total 
From 
quintile       Total 
1  15.9  3.9 1.9 1.3 1.3 24.3  1  6.2 2.3 1.1 1.2 2.1 12.9 
2  4.0 5.2 3.5 1.8 0.9 15.4  2  1.8 3.3 2.2 1.0 1.3  9.5 
3  1.9 2.6 6.0 4.5 1.6 16.6  3  1.4 1.6 3.3 2.3 2.1 10.7 
4  1.6 1.5 2.7 8.0 4.8 18.5  4  1.1 1.3 2.5 5.4 5.2 15.5 
5  1.2 0.6 0.9 3.0  19.5  25.2  5  2.5 1.5 2.6 6.7  38.1  51.4 
Total  24.6 13.8 15.0 18.6 28.0 100.0 Total  13.1  9.9  11.7 16.6 48.7 100.0
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  This latter result does not coincide with Thoresen and Alstadsæter’s (2008), referred to 
earlier, who found that business owners benefitted from organizational moves. Therefore, in order to 
assess the effect of employing income measures for longer time periods, which would align the present 
approach with that followed by Thoresen and Alstadsæter (2008), incomes are aggregated over five-
year periods (letting occupation of the last year of each period define occupational categories).
10 As 
shown in Table 8, organizational shifts now go together with upward movement in income rankings 
for five-year income measures. There may be various explanations for the dependency on the 
timeframe. The five-year specification, compared to the calendar year approach, captures lagged 
effects of organizational shifts. “Smoothing” of incomes over time may also affect business owners 
and wage earners differently, given the wider income variation among the former group (as seen in 
Table 3). Five-year aggregations may therefore moderate the effect of one or two less profitable years. 
We return to this periodization issue in the next section. 
    
Table 8.   Shifts from wage earner to owner of small business and shift from self-employment 
and closely held firm to widely held firm. Percentage of “shifters” for combinations of 
period t-1 and period t quintiles. Transitions between five-year periods, 1993–1998 
and 1998–2003. 
From wage earner to owner of small business 
(29,468 obs) 
From self-employment and closely held firm to 
widely held firm (5,878 obs) 
To quintile    To quintile    From 
quintile  1 2 3 4 5  Total 
From 
quintile 1 2 3 4 5  Total 
1  13.9  3.4 1.5 0.7 0.6 20.1  1  6.6 2.8 1.9 1.2 1.8 14.3 
2  5.2 5.9 3.7 1.5 0.6 16.9  2  1.5 3.1 2.3 1.9 1.8 10.5 
3  2.4 4.0 5.9 4.5 1.3 18.1  3  0.6 1.4 3.1 3.1 2.7 11.0 
4  1.1 2.0 4.2 8.5 4.3 20.2  4  0.4 1.0 2.4 5.7 6.3 15.7 
5  0.3 0.6 1.0 4.0  18.9  24.8  5  0.3  0.6  1.3 5.5  40.7  48.4 
Total  22.8 15.9 16.3 19.2 25.7 100.0 Total  9.3  9.0 11.0 17.4 53.3 100.0
4.  Further description of the correlation between business 
ownership and income movements  
4.1 Specification of a transition equation 
The relationship between business ownership and position in the income hierarchy is further explored 
by a multivariate approach. The main advantage of a multivariate approach is that other observed 
                                                      
10 The empirical approach in Thoresen and Alstadsæter (2008) is also based on aggregated incomes, but not the same 
aggregation as used here.   19
influences can be controlled for when establishing a relationship between business ownership and 
income movement. Moreover, the panel data that are available for this study are not only useful as 
information on the movement of the same individuals over time, they help us address the effect of 
unobserved factors. In the following we estimate conditional equations, dependent on statuses in 
period t-1 and t, to assess the correlation between small business ownership, upward income mobility 
and high income persistence, when other observable and unobservable effects are addressed.  
  Before presenting the multivariate approach, we should note the emphasis here on non-
causal interpretation of results. Owners of small businesses obviously self-select into the group, so that 
interpreting the results in terms of causal effects require methods that control for group allocation 
mechanisms. The main objective of the present study is to describe the achievements of owners of 
small businesses during a period with a dual income tax system in place, and not for a randomly 
selected person choosing business ownership. This is in accordance with assumptions implicitly or 
explicitly made by other studies closely related to the present study; see the review of literature in 
Section 2.   
  We address multivariate evidence through estimations of transition rates, which is a logical 
extension of the mobility matrices approach seen in the previous section. In the following, the 
approach is presented with reference to the relationship between business ownership and upward 
movement, but the same type of approach may be used for the analysis of high-income persistence.  
The latent probability for individual i belonging to state “non-rich” at time t-1, yit−1
* , can be 
seen as depending on a vector of explanatory variables, xit−1, and individual effectαi , and an error 
term, τit−1, 
(3)     yit−1
* = xit−1
' β +αi +τit−1. 
The observed outcome, yit−1, can be seen as taking values 0 or 1 dependent on the latent probability of 
being non-rich, as defined by a cut-off point, λ. Let us reserve 1 for being rich. Then we have 
 










Assuming that     τit−1 : N(0,σu
2) , such a model can be estimated as  
(4) 
   
Py it−1 = 0 ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ =Φ −xit−1
' β −αi ( ),   20
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Similarly, we can also see the 
placement in period t for individuals who are non-rich in period t-1 as following from the same type of 
modeling: 
(5)     yit
* = zit
' γ +αi +ξit , 
where    zit
'  is a vector of explanatory variables explaining outcome in t, given that the individual is non-
rich at t-1, and  ξit  is an normally distributed error term. This leads to a joint probability for observing 
both being rich in period t and being non-rich in period t-1: 
(6) 
   
Py it =1, yit−1 = 0 ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ =Φ 2(zit−1γ +αi,−xit
' β −αi), 
where  Φ2 is the cumulative distribution function of the bivariate standard normal. Unobserved 
heterogeneity in equations (3) and (4) is represented by individual specific time invariant effects, αi, 
plus error terms,    τit−1and  ξit  in the two equations, respectively. Letting uit−1 =αi +τit−1 
and εit =αi +ξit , the approach taken in this study, i.e., focusing on non-causal results, means that the 
relationship between error terms, 
   
τit−1,ξit () , is not explicitly addressed. Obviously, unobservables 
determining the base year probability to be non-rich are correlated with the unobservables determining 
the conditional transfer into being rich in period t. This is a version of the initial condition problem of 
dynamic discrete choice models, see Heckman (1981). However, endogeneity problems in this 
analysis are also due to the key explanatory variable, business ownership, being clearly endogenous 
with the income hierarchy placement in period t-1 and with the placement in period t. Thus, given 
these measurement problems, we interpret results in terms of non-causal relationships, focusing on 
correlations between income hierarchy movements and business ownership. If we neglect the 
dependency between error terms, the conditional probability can be seen as, 
(7) 
   
Py it =1 yit−1 = 0 ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ =
Φ2 −xit−1
' β −αi,zit
' γ +αi ()
Φ− xit−1
' β − ai ()
=Φ (zit
' γ +αi). 
Equation (7) defines the probability of being rich in at t, conditional on being non-rich at t-1, as related 
to a number of explanatory variables, including being an owner of a small business. With information 
from 10 waves of transitions, 
 
1993/ 94,1994/ 95,...,2002/ 2003 { }, we estimate an average correlation 
between business ownership and transitions into “rich” for the period 1993–2003, when the dual 
income tax system was in force. A similar type of reasoning generates a corresponding equation for 
the probability of staying rich, given that the individual was rich in period t-1. We use an identical set   21
of explanatory variables for the two equations (identical z-vectors). Estimations of conditional 
probabilities or transition rates have, for example, recently been seen in the literature focusing on the 
low end of the income distribution, explaining low pay dynamics, low income dynamics and poverty 
dynamics; see for instance Stewart and Swaffield (1999) and Cappellari and Jenkins (2002; 2004).  
  As seen in Equation (7), the empirical approach allows us to take an individual specific time 
invariant effect into account when describing the transitions, represented by αi. We will treat this as a 
random effect and estimate equation (7) by the random effects probit model. This means, see e.g., 
Wooldridge (2002), there is no correlation between observed explanatory variables and the individual 
effect, 
   
E αi zi () = 0, where
   
zi ≡ zi1993,zi1994,...,zi2003 () . However, note how the estimation of Equation 
(7) in effect turns the panel into an unbalanced panel, which implies that random effects estimations 
are only carried out for individuals observed more than one time. This selection may be non-innocent, 
and is the main reason for also referring to pooled probit estimates (in the Appendix).  
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 9 presents descriptive statistics for the two estimated equations: one for becoming rich and one 
for staying rich. All figures are averages across the 10 waves that we have information 
for:
 
1993/ 94,1994/ 95,...,2002/ 2003 { }. Estimations are carried out both for quintile and decile 
specifications.  
  There is a large degree of permanence at the high end on the income distribution; on average 
approximately 80 percent of the people at the upper quintile at year t were there in year t-1, whereas as 
the corresponding figure for the decile specification is 76 percent, see the “Stay rich” columns. 
Correspondingly, people do not move as frequently into the upper quintile and upper decile, see the 
“Upward mobility” columns, only 4.9 percent and 2.6 percent on average.   
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Table 9.   Descriptive statistics for variables used to describe relationships to upward mobility 
and staying rich, quintile and decile specifications. Average measures for 10 yearly 
waves, standard deviations in parentheses 
Upward mobility:  
non-rich at time t-1 













Move into high end  0.049 (0.216)  0.026 (0.160)  -  - 
Stay at high end  -  -  0.804 (0.397)  0.764 (0.425) 
Ownership small 
business, narrow def. 
0.104 (0.305)  0.107 (0.309)  0.177 (0.382)  0.226 (0.418) 
Ownership small 
business, wide def. 
0.119 (0.324)  0.124 (0.329)  0.222 (0.415)  0.284 (0.451) 
Age  40.4 (6.8)  40.5 (6.7)  41.2 (6.0)  41.8 (5.8) 
Male  0.51 (0.50)  0.54 (0.50)  0.79 (0.41)  0.84 (0.36) 
Married  0.60 (0.49)  0.60 (0.49)  0.66 (0.47)  0.71 (0.46) 
Dummy for children  0.72 (0.45)  0.73 (0.44)  0.80 (0.40)  0.81 (0.39) 
Urban areas  0.32 (0.47)  0.33 (0.47)  0.46 (0.50)  0.50 (0.50) 
Not born W-Europe, 
N-Amer., Oceania 
0.02 (0.14)  0.02 (0.14)  0.01 (0.12)  0.01 (0.12) 
Length of education  11.5 (2.2)  11.7 (2.3)  13.0 (2.7)  13.3 (2.8) 
Fields of education:         
General programs  0.12 (0.32)  0.12 (0.32)  0.08 (0.27)  0.08 (0.27) 
Humanities and arts  0.14 (0.35)  0.14 (0.34)  0.10 (0.30)  0.09 (0.29) 
Teacher training and 
pedagogy 
0.05 (0.22)  0.05 (0.22)  0.03 (0.18)  0.03 (0.16) 
Social sciences and 
law 
0.04 (0.20)  0.04 (0.21)  0.04 (0.20)  0.04 (0.19) 
Business and 
administration 
0.18 (0.38)  0.18 (0.38)  0.20 (0.40)  0.22 (0.42) 
Natural sciences  0.26 (0.44)  0.27 (0.45)  0.37 (0.48)  0.36 (0.48) 
Health, welfare and 
sports 
0.08 (0.28)  0.08 (0.27)  0.06 (0.23)  0.07 (0.25) 
Primary industries  0.05 (0.23)  0.05 (0.22)  0.05 (0.21)  0.05 (0.22) 
Transport and 
communication 
0.03 (0.18)  0.03 (0.18)  0.04 (0.20)  0.04 (0.20) 
Unspecified  0.04 (0.19)  0.04 (0.19)  0.02 (0.16)  0.02 (0.14) 
Number of 
observations 
7,180,154 8,077,658 1,795,006  897,502 
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4.3 Estimation results 
4.3.1 Ownership of small businesses and upward mobility 
Let us first address the effect of being an owner of a small business on upward mobility. As 
estimations are based on a random effect probit model and as the key explanatory variable is a dummy 
variable, we need to describe the procedures by which we identify the effects of the explanatory 
variables. In the tables we report marginal effects, calculated for predicted probabilities of positive 
outcomes.
11 The effect of the discrete variable representing business ownership or not is calculated for 
a discrete change from 0 to 1 in this dummy variable, holding the other covariates at their means. The 
estimations also involve time dummies, the coefficients of which are not reported.
12  
  Table 10 shows results for two specifications of conditional probabilities or transitions rates: 
one based on quintiles, transition into the upper quintile (quintile 5) in year t if located in quintile 1-4 
in year t-1, and one based on deciles, transition into decile 10 in year t if placed in deciles 1-9 in year 
t-1. Independent of specification, and as expected, there is a positive relationship between business 
ownership and income advancement; using the wider definition of business owners enhances this 
positive relationship. However, the effect of business ownership and of the wider definition are 
modest: being a business owner increases the probability for moving into quintile 5 by 3.3 percent on 
the narrow definition and 3.8 percent on the wide definition. The corresponding estimates for moving 
upward to decile 10 are 1.3 percent and 1.6 percent on the narrow and wide definition, respectively. 
  As noted when discussing the mobility tables of Section 3, we may expect to find a stronger 
relationship between business ownership and upward mobility later in the period 1993–2003. Indeed, 
estimations restricted to transitions in 2001, 2002 and 2003 do show somewhat stronger effects, 4.8 
percent according to the quintile specification for the wide definition of business owners. 
    
 
                                                      
11 The xtprobit routine of Stata is used. 
12 All tables report estimates for the proportion of the total variance contributed by the person level variance, rho. When rho 
is zero, a panel model, such as the random effects model, is not a significant improvement.   24
Table 10.  Relationship between upward mobility and business ownership. Results for marginal 
effects based on random effects probit estimations of yearly transitions, for two 
definitions of owners of small businesses. Quintile and decile specifications, standard 
errors in parentheses 
Quintile specification  Decile specification   




Owners of small 
businesses, wide 
definition 




Owners of small 
businesses, wide 
definition 
Ownership of small 
business 
0.033 (3.4×10
-4) 0.038  (3.4×10
-4) 0.013  (1.6×10


















Male 0.029  (1.7×10
-4) 0.028  (1.7×10
-4) 0.009  (7.0×10
-5) 0.008  (7.0×10
-5) 
Married   -0.006 (1.2×10









Dummy for children  0.011 (1.0×10
-4) 0.011  (1.0×10
-4) 0.002  (3.0×10
-5) 0.002  (3.0×10
-5) 
Urban areas  0.011 (1.5×10
-4) 0.011  (1.5×10
-4) 0.004  (5.0×10
-5) 0.004  (5.0×10
-5) 
Not born W-Europe, 
N-Amer., Oceania 
-0.006 (2.4×10
-4) -0.006  (2.4×10
-4) -0.002  (6.0×10
-5) -0.002  (6.0×10
-5) 
Length of education  0.005 (3.0×10
-5) 0.005  (3.0×10
-5) 0.001  (1.0×10
-5) 0.001  (1.0×10
-5) 
Dummies for fields of 
education: 
    
General progr.  0.003 (3.3×10
-4) 0.003  (3.3×10
-4) 0.002  (1.3×10
-4) 0.002  (1.3×10
-4) 
















Teacher training and 
pedagogy 
-0.009 (1.7×10
-4) -0.009  (1.7×10
-4) -0.002  (5.0×10
-5) -0.002  (5.0×10
-5) 
Social sciences and 
law 
-0.007 (1.9×10
-4) -0.007  (2.0×10
-4) -0.002  (6.0×10





-4) 0.005  (3.3×10
-4) 0.003  (1.4×10
-4) 0.003  (1.3×10
-4) 
Natural sciences  0.002 (2.8×10









Health, welfare and 
sports 
-0.003 (2.5×10









Primary industries  -0.002 (2.7×10





















Rho  0.453 (0.001)  0.446 (0.001)  0.449 (0.002)  0.463 (0.001) 
LR-test of rho=0  Prob>=0.000  Prob>=0.000  Prob>=0.000  Prob>=0.000 
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  Regarding the relationship to other variables, we see that being male, having children, living 
in an urban area, and length of education are positively correlated with upward mobility, whereas age, 
being married and birth outside Western Europe, North-America and Oceania are not. The dummy 
variables for field of education are defined in relation to the omitted reference category, an unspecified 
broad field of education. Note also that the likelihood ratio test of a non-significant random effect is 
clearly rejected; the random effects model is therefore preferable to alternatives without individual 
effects, such as pooled probit. However, as noted earlier, the random effects estimation involves non-
trivial restrictions in the sample employed in the estimations, i.e. restricting to individuals represented 
in more than one wave. Results from pooled probit estimations are shown in Table A1 in the 
Appendix.  
  As we see, the parameter estimates for “male” are just below the parameter estimates for 
small business ownership. Another way of setting parameter estimates for business ownership into 
perspective is to compare them to a similar random effects estimation of downward mobility, i.e., 
using the same explanatory variables for transitions from quintiles 2-5 down to quintile 1. Such 
estimation generates (positive) parameter values for business ownership of approximately the same 
size as those featured in Table 10. The present analysis can therefore be said to confirm the uncertain 
character of income from business ownership, leading to overrepresentation of owners of small 
businesses at the low and high ends of the income distribution scale, see Table 2 and Table 3. 
4.3.2 The relationship to staying rich 
The next question concerns the extent to which involvement in business ownership increases the 
probability of staying at the high end of the income distribution scale. Table 11 shows results of 
random effects probit estimations based on conditional probabilities for staying in the upper quintile or 
in the upper decile in year t, given that the persons were in the same position in year t-1. As we see, 
the relationship is negative according to the quintile specification and positive only after restricting to 
rich in terms as defined by the decile specification. However, again the parameter estimates are small. 
The probability of staying rich is higher if the subject is male, married, has children, lives in an urban 
setting, was born in Western Europe, North America or Oceania, and is well educated. Most 
importantly, the wider definition of income strengthens the positive relationship for the decile 
specification and reduces the negative effect according to the quintile alternative.   
  As measures of upward mobility were compared to downward mobility in the previous 
section, it is illustrative to compare the estimates of Table 11 to similar estimates from “stay-poor” 
estimations. Such comparisons reveal that business ownership is positively related to staying at the 
low end of the income distribution, again confirming the symmetry of relationships to business 
ownership at both tails of the income distribution.       26
Table 11.  Relationship between staying rich and business ownership. Results for marginal 
effects based on random effects probit estimations of yearly transitions, for two 
definitions of owners of small businesses. Quintile and decile specifications, standard 
errors in parentheses  
Quintile specification  Decile specification   




Owners of small 
businesses, wide 
definition  




Owners of small 
businesses, wide 
definition  
Ownership of small 
business 
-0.011 (0.001)  -0.004 (0.001)  0.011 (0.002)  0.016 (0.002) 
Age 0.002  (1.0×10
-4) 0.002  (1.0×10
-4) 0.003  (1.6×10
-4) 0.003  (1.6×10
-4) 
Male  0.150 (0.002)  0.150 (0.002)  0.173 (0.003)  0.172 (0.003) 
Married   0.018 (0.001)  0.018 (0.001)  0.046 (0.002)  0.045 (0.002) 
Dummy for children  0.072 (0.001)  0.072 (0.001)  0.071 (0.002)  0.071 (0.002) 
Urban areas  0.077 (0.001)  0.077 (0.001)  0.080 (0.002)  0.081 (0.002) 
Not born W-Europe, 
N-Amer., Oceania 
-0.122 (0.005)  -0.122 (0.005)  -0.109 (0.008) -0.109  (0.008) 
Length of education  0.035 (2.3×10
-4) 0.035  (2.3×10
-4) 0.036  (3.7×10
-4) 0.036  (3.7×10
-4) 
Dummies for fields of 
education: 
    
General progr.  0.057 (0.003)  0.057 (0.003)  0.078 (0.005)  0.078 (0.005) 
Humanities and arts  0.048 (0.003)  0.048 (0.003)  0.068 (0.005) 0.068  (0.005) 
Teacher training and 
pedagogy 
-0.038 (0.004)  -0.038 (0.004)  -0.015 (0.006) -0.016  (0.006) 
Social sciences and 
law 
-0.033 (0.004)  -0.034 (0.004)  0.018 (0.006)  0.018 (0.006) 
Business and 
administration 
0.072 (0.002)  0.072 (0.002)  0.101 (0.004)  0.101 (0.004) 
Natural sciences  0.048 (0.003)  0.048 (0.003)  0.045 (0.005)  0.045 (0.005) 
Health, welfare and 
sports 
0.052 (0.003)  0.051 (0.003)  0.099 (0.004)  0.098 (0.004) 
Primary industries  0.016 (0.003)  0.015 (0.003)  0.046 (0.005)  0.046 (0.005) 
Transport and 
communication 
0.021 (0.003)  0.020 (0.003)  0.024 (0.005)  0.024 (0.005) 
Rho  0.405 (0.002)  0.446 (0.001)  0.416 (0.002)  0.416 (0.002) 
LR-test of rho=0  Prob>=0.000  Prob>=0.000  Prob>=0.000  Prob>=0.000 
 
4.3.2 Alternative categorizations of time periods 
So far, it has been established that business ownership increases the likelihood of upward mobility and 
stability  at the high end of the income distribution scale (the latter only established for the decile   27
specification, though). Moreover, employing a wider definition of business owners is found to enhance 
relationships.  
  Given indications of an effect of the time frame for measuring incomes on results, see 
Section 3.3 and Holtz-Eakin et al. (2000), estimations for alternative time period specifications may be 
illuminating. Table 12 shows the results of an estimation of transition models for a three period 
specification, transitions between 1993–1996 and 1997–1999 and between 1997–1999 and 2000–
2003. Placements in the income hierarchies are based on aggregated post-tax incomes for these three 
time periods. With fewer transitions available, a pooled probit estimation is preferred, i.e., no random 
effects estimation. Thus, the relevant comparisons (in terms of estimates from yearly transitions) for 
the estimates of Table 12 are estimates presented in table A1 and A2 in the Appendix. 
  Echoing the results of Table 8, estimates presented in Table 12 show larger differences 
between correlations according to both the narrow and the wide definitions of business ownership. For 
instance, for upward mobility, being a business owner now increases the probability for moving into 
quintile 5 by 4.7 percent according to the narrow definition and by 6.1 percent according to the wide 
definition. As noted in Section 3.3, the difference between estimates derived from yearly transitions 
and estimates based on data of longer periods may follow from lagged effects, and pooling of incomes 
over years may affect incomes of wage earners and business owners differently, especially owners of 
small businesses who have been involved in shifting the form of the organization. However, the 
contribution of business ownership to mobility mainly shows that parameter estimates tend to reflect 
the uncertain character of income from business ownership. As for the yearly specification, the 
relationship to downward mobility and “staying-poor” have been calculated, and business ownership 
is correlated to downward mobility and “staying poor” approximately in the same manner as upward 
mobility and “staying rich” shown in Table 12.       
 
Table 12.  The contribution from business ownership to upward mobility and staying rich. 
Results for marginal effects based on pooled probit estimations for transitions 
between three periods: 1993–1996, 1997–2000, 2001–2003. Two definitions of owners 
of small businesses, quintile and decile specifications, standard errors in parentheses  
















0.061 (0.001)  0.043 (0.001)  0.053 (0.002)  0.054 (0.001) 
Number of 
observations 
1,436,026  1,615,530 359,006  179,502   28
Summary 
The objective of the present study was to discuss solutions to a measurement problem which occurs 
when the relationship between business ownership and income mobility is explored: as occupational 
boundaries between wage earners and business owners are vague, it may influence results. In 
particular, the introduction of a dual income tax system in 1992 accentuated this problem in the 
Norwegian context, by giving incentives to owners of small businesses to establish widely held firms, 
thereby shifting occupational status from self-employed (or other types of small businesses) to wage 
earner. Since Thoresen and Alstadsæter (2008) found that certain features of the dual income tax 
system in combination with certain features of human capital intensive businesses generated 
organizational shifting, generating substantial income gains for the people involved, we expected 
different definitions of business owner, with and without the tax-payers who shifted organizational 
form, to influence results. 
  Our main finding is that definitions do influence results. Estimations of random effects 
transition models for upward mobility and staying rich reveal stronger correlation between business 
ownership, advancement and maintenance of positions at the top of the income distribution scale (only 
for the decile specification) on the wide definition, which includes small businesses involved in 
organizational shifting. Also, the effect from business ownership is found to be stronger for transitions 
between longer time periods.  
  However, the positive relationship between business ownership and mobility should not be 
interpreted as implying that business owners have improved their relative positions over the time 
period. It mainly reflects higher income mobility of business owners, moving towards and staying at 
either end of the income distribution. Even though the income positions of owners of small firms are 
seen as more advantageous under the wide definition of income, the overall results mainly echo the 
uncertain character of income from small businesses.    
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Appendix 
 
Table A1.  Relationship between upward mobility and business ownership. Results for marginal 
effects based on pooled probit estimations of yearly transitions, for two definitions of 
owners of small businesses. Quintile and decile specifications, standard errors in 
parentheses  
Quintile specification  Decile specification   
Owners of small 
businesses, narrow 
definition 
Owners of small 
businesses, wide 
definition 
Owners of small 
businesses, narrow 
definition 
Owners of small 
businesses, wide 
definition 
Ownership of small 
business 
0.051 (4.1×10
-4) 0.055  (4.0×10
-4) 0.035  (2.9×10











Male 0.039  (2.1×10
-4) 0.037  (2.1×10
-4) 0.023  (1.3×10
-4) 0.021  (1.3×10
-4) 
Married   -0.008 (2.1×10






Dummy for children  0.018 (1.0×10
-4) 0.018  (1.0×10
-4) 0.007  (1.2×10
-4) 0.006  (1.2×10
-4) 
Urban areas  0.016 (2.1×10
-4) 0.016  (2.0×10
-4) 0.010  (1.3×10
-4) 0.010  (1.3×10
-4) 
Not born W-Europe, 
N-Amer., Oceania 
-0.012 (4.7×10
-4) -0.012  (4.7×10
-4) -0.008  (2.6×10
-4) -0.008  (2.6×10
-4) 
Length of education  0.009 (4.2×10
-5) 0.009  (4.2×10
-5) 0.005  (2.4×10
-5) 0.005  (2.5×10
-5) 
Dummies for fields of 
education: 
     
General progr.  0.007 (5.6×10
-4) 0.007  (5.5×10
-4) 0.007  (4.2×10
-4) 0.007  (4.2×10
-4) 




-4) 0.002  (3.4×10
-4) 0.001  (3.3×10
-4) 
Teacher training and 
pedagogy 
-0.021 (3.3×10
-4) -0.021  (3.3×10
-4) -0.011  (2.0×10
-4) -0.011  (2.0×10
-4) 
Social sciences and 
law 
-0.019 (3.5×10
-4) -0.019  (3.5×10
-4) -0.010  (2.2×10





-4) 0.008  (5.1×10
-4) 0.008  (3.9×10
-4) 0.008  (3.8×10
-4) 
Natural sciences  0.002 (4.7×10
-4) 0.002  (4.6×10
-4) 0.003  (3.2×10
-4) 0.003  (3.2×10
-4) 
Health, welfare and 
sports 
-0.007 (4.6×10






Primary industries  -0.009 (4.6×10
-4) -0.009  (4.5×10
-4) -0.002  (3.4×10





-4) 0.005  (6.0×10
-4) 0.003  (4.1×10
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Table A2.  Relationship between staying rich and business ownership. Results for marginal 
effects based on pooled probit estimations of yearly transitions, for two definitions of 
owners of small businesses. Quintile and decile specifications, standard errors in 
parentheses  
Quintile specification  Decile specification   
Owners of small 
businesses, narrow 
definition  
Owners of small 
businesses, wide 
definition  
Owners of small 
businesses, narrow 
definition  
Owners of small 
businesses, wide 
definition  
Ownership of small 
business 
-0.023 (0.001)  -0.015 (0.001)  -0.008 (0.001)  -0.003 (0.001) 
Age 0.002  (1.0×10
-4) 0.004  (1.0×10
-4) 0.004  (1.1×10
-4) 0.004  (1.1×10
-4) 
Male  0.096 (0.001)  0.107 (0.002)  0.107 (0.002)  0.107 (0.002) 
Married   0.022 (0.001)  0.041 (0.001)  0.041 (0.001)  0.041 (0.001) 
Dummy for children  0.040 (0.001)  0.040 (0.001)  0.040 (0.002)  0.040 (0.002) 
Urban areas  0.051 (0.001)  0.052 (0.001)  0.050 (0.001)  0.050 (0.001) 
Not born W-Europe, N-
Amer., Oceania 
-0.084 (0.004)  -0.084 (0.004)  -0.073 (0.006)  -0.073 (0.001) 
Length of education  0.024 (1.0×10
-4) 0.024  (1.7×10
-4) 0.024  (2.5×10
-4) 0.024  (2.5×10
-4) 
Dummies for fields of 
education: 
    
General progr.  0.057 (0.002)  0.056 (0.002)  0.067 (0.003)  0.067 (0.003) 
Humanities and arts  0.045 (0.002)  0.045 (0.002)  0.055 (0.004)  0.055 (0.004) 
Teacher training and 
pedagogy 
-0.040 (0.003)  -0.040 (0.003)  -0.030 (0.005)  -0.030 (0.005) 
Social sciences and 
law 
-0.041 (0.003)  -0.041 (0.003)  -0.007 (0.005)  -0.007 (0.005) 
Business and 
administration 
0.058 (0.002)  0.058 (0.002)  0.072 (0.003)  0.072 (0.003) 
Natural sciences  0.039 (0.002)  0.039 (0.002)  0.031 (0.004)  0.032 (0.004) 
Health, welfare and 
sports 
0.051 (0.002)  0.051 (0.002)  0.075 (0.003)  0.074 (0.004) 
Primary industries  0.012 (0.003)  0.012 (0.003)  0.036 (0.004)  0.034 (0.004) 
Transport and 
communication 
0.014 (0.002)  0.014 (0.002)  0.007 (0.004)  0.006 (0.004) 
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